



**Heart of Asia Society**

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# **SURVEY OF AFGHAN POLITICAL PREFERENCES RELEVANT TO INTRA-AFGHAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2
INTRODUCTION	4
BACKGROUND	4
METHODOLOGY	6
CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS	6
ANALYSIS	7
FINDINGS	8
Priorities in Intra-Afghan Negotiations	9
System of Government	10
Constitutional Concerns	13
Foreign Troop Presence	15
Future of Taliban Fighters	16
Role of Women in Politics	18
APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE	21
APPENDIX 2: REGRESSION TABLES	22



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Heart of Asia Society conducted a brief mobile phone survey of Afghans' opinions on issues related to the intra-Afghan peace negotiations. The survey was fielded in early August, 2020, and data from 4,912 respondents from all 34 provinces (20% female and 80% male) were analyzed.

Respondents were asked to list their top three priorities for intra-Afghan peace negotiations. Responses were grouped into categories to allow for meaningful analysis, and 79% cited peace/security, 28% cited human rights issues, 21% cited economic development, 19% cited women's rights, 9% cited freedom of speech and youth rights, 7% cited rule of law, and 7% cited education.

When asked if they prefer an Islamic Emirate, an Islamic Republic, a mixture of the two, or had no preference, 75% said they prefer a Republic system, 7% said they prefer an Emirate, 6% said a mixture of the two, and 11% said they have no preference. After controlling for age, education, and income, analysis shows that men were significantly more likely than women to prefer an Emirate, and those with high school or university level education were more likely than those with less education to prefer a Republic.

When asked whether the current constitution should continue to be used as the basis of legal structures and laws following the peace agreement, 32% of respondents said yes, 25% said no, and 32% said that it should be used, but needs to be changed or amended; 10% said they don't know. Men (32%) were slightly more likely than women (29%) to say yes,

and women (14%) were more likely than men (9%) to say they don't know, but men and women had relatively similar responses to "no" (26% and 23% respectively) and "yes, but needs changes" (31% and 33% respectively). Opinions on whether or not the constitution should remain in place do not clearly align with preferred system of government, and those who state a preference for an Emirate do not necessarily reject the current democratic constitution.

When asked if foreign troop presence is necessary to guarantee the implementation of a peace agreement, almost half of respondents (47%) said no, 37% said yes, 9% said it may be helpful, and 6% said they don't know. When controlling for other factors, older respondents were more likely to think the presence of foreign troops is necessary to guarantee peace, while younger respondents think their presence is unnecessary. Female respondents, contrary to male respondents, were more likely to think presence of foreign troops may be helpful, while male respondents were more likely to report presence of foreign troops is not necessary.

Respondents were asked what they think should happen to Taliban fighters if there is a peace agreement with the Afghan Government. They were given the choices of being disarmed and returning to normal life, being integrated into the national security forces, remaining as they are, or to say they don't know. Overall, respondents were most likely to say that fighters should be integrated with the national security forces (45%) or that they should be disarmed (42%), with 7% saying they don't know and 5% saying they should stay as they are. Multivariate analysis shows that older respondents and women were more likely to say the Taliban fighters should stay as they are after a peace agreement, while men were more likely to say Taliban fighters be integrated into the national security forces compared to women.

When asked about their preference for women's role in politics after a peace agreement, respondents were significantly more likely (58%) to say women should have a greater role than to say they should have the same role (19%) or a lesser role (14%). Female respondents were more likely to support a greater or the same role for women in politics after a peace agreement, while younger male respondents were more likely to oppose a greater role for women in politics. Respondents with high school or university education were more likely than those without any education to think the role of women should stay the same, while those with university education were more likely to support an even greater role for women in politics, after controlling for the effects of age, gender, and income.



## INTRODUCTION

In order to contribute to the growing body of knowledge on Afghans' opinions about the ongoing peace process and the future of the country, the Heart of Asia Society (HAS) conducted a rapid survey on several key issues that are likely to be brought up in the peace talks: the modality of government and rule of law, the role of foreign forces in guaranteeing any peace agreement, the future position of Taliban fighters, the role of women, and what Afghans themselves consider the most important priorities of the peace talks.

## BACKGROUND

Debate about the end state for Afghanistan has grown more intense as intra-Afghan negotiations begin, and the contraposition between an Islamic Republic and an Islamic Emirate has become a symbolic rallying point for the conflicting sides. The Afghan Government strongly upholds the Republic as the only framework capable of defending the political and social achievements of the past 19 years, while the Taliban are equally bent on restoring the Emirate, which they view as unjustly overturned by foreign aggression. Despite calls to focus on the contents of the Afghan state and the specified intention to make these decisions according to the will of the Afghan people, the name and system of government is likely to remain a core issue of the negotiations, and one that could prove polarizing. This issue reaches well beyond Afghanistan, as many regional and international actors hold different views about the two alternatives.

The current Afghan Constitution, underpinning the country's republican system of

government, is the product of a long consultative process beginning in 2003 undertaken by Afghan scholars and political leaders with the support of the United Nations. The resulting 2004 Constitution is a carefully balanced document aimed to be a step towards the reconstruction of a country devastated by decades of war. It strives to acknowledge the country's diversity by recognizing minority communities and languages as well as Sunni and Shia schools of jurisprudence, and aims to uphold its unity. It clearly establishes Islam as the national religion and the foundation of state laws while guaranteeing their accordance with international rights standards. However, the continuation of armed resistance and political opposition to the new institutions on the part of the Taliban has made this a politically charged document. Critiques of the present legal system range from pointing to shortages and flaws of the political and judiciary institutions to wholesale rejection of the constitution as an imposed, Western-driven body of laws. The risk of the 2004 Constitution becoming an ideological battleground of the future negotiations is not to be underestimated. The symbolic value of deciding the country's fundamental laws is not lost on either party. Additionally, the call for implementation of Sharia as the sole legal system for a given country has been a prime mobilization tool for Islamist movements worldwide and could garner support for the Taliban among groups that on other grounds would not belong to the movement's natural constituency. The possibility of changes to the Constitution is accepted by the Afghan Government, who insists that any change has to be effected according to the established legal processes for this. Even so, this possibility is proving unsettling to vulnerable groups in Afghan society, who fear seeing their rights lost in a peace settlement.

Other key issues likely to be on the negotiating table include the role of foreign troops in guaranteeing any peace negotiation. With a 19-year NATO presence currently still in place and a long-remembered history of foreign invasion and foreign occupation, the role of foreign military elements on Afghan soil goes beyond strategic security concerns. Likewise, the future of current Taliban fighters, who under the present laws of Afghanistan are considered criminals or military combatants, is a sensitive concern for Afghans, whether they have endured personal tragedy that they blame directly on these fighters or they consider some of the fighters their own relatives or ideological compatriots. The recent government decision to release the last 400 Taliban fighters, albeit those considered the worst offenders, is a debate that has reached the entire country, so the fate of the large number of Taliban fighters will certainly be a contentious issue in discussions of end state.

Since 2001, women in Afghanistan have gained rights and opportunities in education, political representation, employment, and health advocacy and have seen improvements in maternal health, overall mortality rates, and their ability to productively participate in society and family in ways that were barred to them during the period of Taliban control and largely not available during the preceding years of civil conflict. Men, women, and children of Afghanistan have benefited from these gains, and there is worry amongst many Afghans, men and women alike, that some of these achievements could be lost in negotiations for peace. Rights of education eroded by barring co-ed education, rights of public participation reduced or made less effective by dress codes that obscure identity, and the economic contributions of women curtailed and circumscribed—these are distinct and realistic worries of many Afghans, and women's role in society and the political sphere is surely among the issues that will come to the table during intra-Afghan negotiations.

## METHODOLOGY

This survey was conducted by mobile phone using numbers randomly generated in MS Excel following Afghan country codes and network codes.<sup>1</sup> This allowed the data collection team to maintain safe working conditions during the Covid-19 pandemic, reach areas that might not have been safe for in-person interviews, and sample randomly within the population of Afghans that have mobile phones.<sup>2</sup> Training was held on August 6, 2020, and 27 (10 women, 17 men) enumerators collected data on August 7-13, 2020. The interviewers used Pashto or Dari questionnaires depending on the language of the respondent. No interviews were conducted in other languages. Of the 45,000 numbers randomly dialed, just over 10,200 were real numbers, and at least 8,200 calls were answered. Approximately 2,000 people hung up before the interview could begin or after the first question, others hung up after two questions. In the end, over 5,500 interviews were conducted in total, with several hundred removed in data cleaning, including all those from one enumerator discovered to have fabricated data, 87 cases were removed due to interviewees being under 18, and 5 were removed because province was not recorded or given during the interview. Almost half (48%) of the calls made were recorded following consent given by the respondent, 25% of the numbers were called back by a monitoring team, and 10% of the transcripts were checked against recordings. Recorded calls will be stored securely for 6 months following the data collection and then destroyed.

## CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

Mobile phone access and Afghans' access to information is frequently the subject of research. While surveys have shown that 80% of Afghan women have access to a mobile phone<sup>3</sup>, access does not equate with possession. About 15% of the calls placed were answered by women. This can be due to several factors: 1) low-income families might have only one phone, which would typically be in the possession of a male household member during the daytime when the survey was fielded, so they were not able to pass the phone to a female relative even if they were willing to do so; 2) the mobile phone that a woman can access is controlled and monitored by a male relative who would not allow unknown callers;<sup>4</sup> and 3) women themselves are less likely than men to answer calls from unknown numbers due to common phone harassment. Because of the low number of women answering calls or remaining on the calls and despite efforts to target female subjects, only 19.7% of interviews were conducted with women. Supervisors tried to mitigate the low rate of female interviews by asking male enumerators to pass along phone numbers answered

<sup>1</sup> Mobile phone surveys have become more commonly used in Afghanistan in recent years, primarily as a means to increase penetration into hard to reach populations, but is also proving useful as a means of safely maintaining social distancing during the Covid-19 pandemic. For examples of recent work on the methodology, its utility and limitations, see: "Afghanistan World Bank Phone Survey of Afghan Returnees: Methodology and representativeness," World Bank, July 2018; Blumenstock, Joshua. "Estimating Economic Characteristics with Phone Data S-89327-AFG-1," AEA Papers and Proceedings 2018 108: 72-76. May 2018; and "mVAM in Afghanistan: Phone Surveys for Faster and More Accountable Humanitarian Response," VAM Food Security Analysis, World Food Program. November 2016.

<sup>2</sup> Data collection was conducted by Criterion Research and Consultancy Services under the direction of Heart of Asia Society staff. Analysis was done with the assistance of Sayed Masood Sadat.

<sup>3</sup> "Connecting to Opportunity: A Survey of Afghan Women's Access to Mobile Technology," United States Agency for International Development, May 2013, [https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/survey\\_afghan\\_women\\_mobile.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/survey_afghan_women_mobile.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> Faheem Hussain, "Empowering Afghan Women: Does Technology Help or Hinder?" Open Democracy, October 30, 2015, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/creating-new-images-of-afghan-women-does-ict-help-or-hinder/>.



and hung up by women to female enumerators, and female enumerators asked males who answered if they could speak to a female relative to ask them a short survey. While some men seemed amenable to this, many said they were currently at work and were not around their female relatives. It is also possible that the frequent electrical shortages during the period of data collection impacted mobile phone coverage.

The sensitivity of the political questions posed in this survey could have been unintentionally exacerbated by the political tension surrounding the loya jirga convened to discuss Taliban prisoner release, which began on the same day as data collection and proceeded for three days.<sup>5</sup> Some potential respondents expressed suspicion with the questions being asked during the loya jirga and others expressed suspicion or fear that they were being asked for ulterior motives. This resulted in many hang ups, sometimes following expletives said to enumerators. Respondents were also told they could skip any question they did not want to answer, and many skipped one or more questions or responded with only one open-ended answer when they could have provided three.

While mobile phone coverage in Afghanistan has grown exponentially in the past decade, rural areas still have lower coverage and more frequent service interruptions, which leads to an urban bias in responses. Likewise, families with higher incomes tend to have more mobile phones, so any random survey is more likely to reach individuals in higher income brackets as opposed to lower income brackets. Populations such as those living in IDP camps where there is very low mobile phone access or poor service coverage are likely not represented well in this survey. Finally, there is no way to ground-truth responses to ensure the accuracy of location or age of respondent.

## ANALYSIS

Data was entered first into MS Excel, then analysis and visualizations were carried out in R v. 3.6.1 and Stata v. 15.1. The analysis was conducted without weighting, with the following issues in mind.

Weight is used to obtain estimates of population parameters of interest from the sample parameters. Applying weight corrects for disproportionate sample designs and makes the estimates representative of the underlying population. To design weight for a survey, the population proportions need to be known. In this survey, adult Afghan men and women with a cell phone were targeted. However, weight could not be designed and used in the survey analysis because the sampling probabilities of those selected for survey were unknown at the time of analysis. To construct weight, sample parameters are compared to the parameters of a population, usually known through a national census. For instance, ratio demographic groups such as men or women with cell phone are unknown. As this sample was obtained using randomly generated phone numbers, and assuming there is no systematic pattern in response rate, we can expect minor sampling bias and the sampling parameters should reflect many of the underlying population parameters. However, as noted in the limitation section, some demographics, particularly men, seem to be more likely to participate in the survey as opposed to women. This is likely also the case with lower income and rural/low coverage area populations.<sup>6</sup>

The survey included only six demographic factors and six perception questions, so the multivariate analysis is quite circumscribed; in total, 39 regression models were made to

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5 “Afghan President Agrees Taliban Prisoner Release,” Al Jazeera, August 9, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/afghan-president-agrees-taliban-prisoner-release-200809063717608.html>.

estimate the impact of age, gender, education, and income on each response to the perception questions. The regression models are summarized in Appendix 2. Statistically significant relationships at 10% confidence level (p-value < 0.1) are discussed in the findings section.

In order to make the data easier to compare with larger and longitudinally substantial nationwide surveys, regional groupings of provinces were made according to the long-used system found in the Survey of the Afghan People produced annually by The Asia Foundation since 2006.<sup>7</sup>

## FINDINGS

### Priorities in Intra-Afghan Negotiations

Respondents were asked to list their top three priorities for the upcoming intra-Afghan negotiations. Responses were categorized into 22 themes, and percentages of respondents result in sums over 100% because they were allowed to give three responses, although many did not. The overwhelming majority of respondents (78.7%) gave at least one response related to peace and security (see Figure 1). This did not vary significantly by gender, age, education, income, or region. Responses related to human rights, including ethnic inclusion and religious inclusion, were given by 27.6% of respondents, and 21.0% of respondents cited concerns with economy and development. Issues related to women’s rights were given by 18.6% of respondents. Freedom of speech and youth issues (9.4%), rule of law (7.3%), and education (7.3%) were also common concerns.




Figure 1: Top priorities for peace negotiations (respondents were allowed three answers, so figures total over 100%)

6 We calculated the margin of error for the survey based on simple random sample design (SRS) with an important caveat that population parameters are unknown. Margin of error is formulated for the SRS below:

$$MoE = CV \times \sqrt{\frac{p(1-p)}{n}}$$

Where, MoE is margin of error, CV is critical value, p is the proportion of responses, and n is the sample size. For reporting purposes, we use the proportion of the responses who said “Islamic Republic” to the first question, that is p = 0.745. The margin of error is calculated to be 1.22% for the following sample size n=4,912, and p=0.745 at the 95% CI level.

$$MoE = 1.96 \times \sqrt{\frac{0.745 \times 0.255}{4912}} = 1.96 \times 0.00622 = 0.0122$$

7 These regional groupings of provinces are as follows: Central/Kabul: Panjsher, Wardak, Kabul, Logar, Kapisa, and Parwan; East: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar, and Nooristan; South East: Paktia, Ghazni, Khost, and Paktika; South West: Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Nimroz, and Zabul; West: Herat, Ghor, Farah, and Badghis; North East: Baghlan, Badakhshan, Kunduz, and Takhar. Central/Hazarajat: Daikundi and Bamyan; and North West: Balkh, Faryab, Samangan, Sari-e-Pul, and Jawzjan.

Male and female respondents were equally likely to mention peace/security, freedom of speech and youth rights, rule of law, and issues related to reconstruction and the economy. Female respondents (36.5%) were significantly more likely than male (14.2%) to cite issues related to women's rights, including the right to work, the right to equal access to education, and countering violence against women and girls, and women were more likely than men to cite education concerns in general (10.9% of women and 6.4% of men). Men were more likely than women to cite issues related to Sharia law and issues of Muslim integrity (4.0% of men and 0.8% of women), power sharing/unity (5.8% of men and 3.8% of women), and human rights, including equal rights for minorities and ethnicities (28.4% of men and 24.0% of women).

Respondents with university education (12.6%) or high school education (10.6%) were more likely than respondents with less education (ranging from 4.8% to 8.0%) to cite freedom of speech and youth rights and women's rights (24.3% of respondents with university education and 12.0% of respondents with no education). Respondents with no education and those who refused to provide their education level were significantly less likely than other respondents to provide three answers and were more likely to say "I don't know," but were as equally likely as others to cite peace/security, and commonly cited human rights issues (21.9% of those with no education, 26.7% of those who did not provide an education level), reconstruction/economic issues (21.2% of those with no education, 17.5% of those who did not provide an education level) and either women's rights (12.0% of those with no education) or rule of law (15.5% of those who did not provide an education level). The age of respondents did not affect the likelihood of most answers, but those in the youngest age group of 18 to 25 years old (8.1%) were more likely than those in the oldest bracket of over 45 years old (5.2%) to cite education, and significantly more likely to cite women's rights (21.2% and 12.9% respectively).

Respondents of all income brackets equally prioritize some issues, including peace/security and power sharing/unity, but respondents in the lower income bracket were more likely than those in the upper income bracket to cite rule of law (9.7% of lower, 5.1% of upper), reconstruction and economic concerns (27.4% of lower, 18.6% of upper), and corruption (2.4% of lower, 0.3% of upper). Respondents in the upper income bracket were more likely than those in the lower to cite freedom of speech and youth rights (15.7% of upper, 4.9% of lower), and women's rights (21.6% of upper and 15.1% of lower).

The overwhelming majority of respondents in all regions provided an answer related to peace/security, with little variation (from 77.7% to 81.3% of respondents in all regions). Regional variation is significant for some negotiation priorities, however, and when disaggregated further by gender, it is apparent that some issues are of greater concern to men or to women in different parts of the country. Concerns related to freedom of speech and youth rights were significantly more likely to be cited by respondents in the South West (19.5%) than any other region, where responses ranged from 6.3% in the East to 12.1% in the North East. Likewise, the respondents in the South West (40.1%) were significantly more likely to cite human rights concerns, compared to 25.6% to 28.2% of respondents in other regions. Women's rights were more likely to be cited by respondents in the West (22.4%) the Central/Kabul (21.3%), the North East (18.1%), the South East (18.1%), and Central/Hazarajat (17.0%) regions, and less likely by respondents in the North West (16.2%), East (13.9%), and South West (11.8%) regions. Women in the Central/Kabul (42.9%) and the West (41.2%) regions were more likely than men in those regions to cite women's rights (14.9% and 17.7% respectively), whereas women (21.4%) and men (15.2%) of the Central/Hazarajat region show the smallest disparity, perhaps due to the already high approval for women's rights in that region and women's relative freedom of movement and familial support of participation in political and economic spheres. In almost all regions, men cited concerns



related to Sharia law more than women, yet in the South East, women were slightly more likely than men to say this should be a priority for negotiations (3.5% to 3.2%, respectively).

Multivariate analysis shows that male respondents were more likely than women to cite “reconstruction/economic development” and “education” and were less likely to cite pro-Taliban statements and statements about ISIS as top priorities in negotiations with the Taliban. Higher age is associated with peace/security and education as top priorities. Moreover, respondents with a university education, complete or otherwise, were more likely than those without any education to suggest “education,” “territorial integrity and stability,” “securing of achievements,” and pro-Taliban statements as top priorities. Respondents with a high school education, completed or otherwise, were more likely than those without any education to cite “rule of law,” “securing of achievements,” pro-Taliban statements, and “education” as the top priorities. Those with primary school education, complete or otherwise, were more likely to cite “peace/security” and “anti-Taliban” as top priorities for negotiations with the Taliban. Respondents with higher income were more likely to cite “securing of achievements,” “education,” and “corruption,” while less likely to cite “human rights” and “aiding poor/injured.”

## System of Government

Respondents were asked which governmental system they preferred to come out of potential peace talks, and close to three-quarters (74.5%) said they prefer a Republic system rather than an Emirate (7.4%), a mixture of the two (6.2%), or said that they have no preference (11.0%).<sup>8</sup> Women (77.6%) were slightly more likely than men (73.7%) to prefer a Republic, and men (8.1%) were slightly more likely than women (4.8%) to prefer an Emirate. Of the respondents who provided their monthly income, those with the higher income range of over 15,000 Afs per month (81.2%) were more likely than respondents of mid-income range of 7,501-15,000 Afs per month (76.5%) or those in the low-income range of 0-7,500 Afs per month (72.9%) to prefer a Republic system, though respondents of low (7.3%) and middle (7.9%) income were similarly likely to prefer an Emirate, only slightly higher than the 5.4% of higher income respondents. Respondents in the lower income range were more likely (16.3%) than those of middle income (9.0%) and higher income (6.7%) to say they have no preference.

As respondents’ level of education increases, preference for a Republic system tends to increase (see figure 4), although those with a religious/madrassa education<sup>9</sup> were more likely (13.9%) to prefer an Emirate system than other education levels, which range from 6.0% to 8.9% preference for an Emirate system. Age of respondents was not a significant factor, with less than 3 percentage points of variance among all age groupings of respondents.

<sup>8</sup> These results are similar to those found in a survey conducted by the Institute of War and Peace Studies, which found that 67.8% prefer a Republic, 7.7% prefer an Emirate, 16.0% prefer a mixture, and 8.5% say it does not matter. See: Enayat Najafizada, Mustafa Sarwari, and Mohammad Erfani, “The Afghan People’s Peace Perception Survey: Second Edition.” The Institute of War and Peace Studies. August 2020, Afghanistan.

<sup>9</sup> The sample size of those with religious or madrassa education is low, so should not be considered significant.




Figure 4: Preferred system of by education level

Respondents in the Central/Hazarajat (79.6%), South West (77.5%), South East (77.5%) and Central/Kabul (76.9%) regions were more likely to cite a preference for a Republic than respondents in the North East (72.3%), East (72.0%), West (68.8%) and North West (68.4%) regions, and respondents in the South West (11.5%), West (9.7%), and North East (9.0%) regions were more likely than others to prefer an Emirate. Respondents in some regions had particularly high rates of no preference, including the North West (15.7%) and West (13.1%).

Respondents from Panjsher (86.7%) and Kandahar (85.1%) were most likely to prefer a Republic system, and respondents from Herat (67.8%), Logar (65.8%), Samangan (65.5%), Faryab (63.4%), Helmand (62.8%), and Jawzjan (58.1%) were the least likely. Respondents from Helmand (21.8%), Khost (14.1%), and Sar-e-pul (13.7%) were the most likely to prefer an Emirate, while respondents from Ghazni (4.7%) were the least likely (see Figures 2 and 3).




Figure 2: Respondents who prefer an Islamic Emirate, by province




Figure 3: Respondents who prefer an Islamic Republic, by province

Respondents who stated preference for a Republic were more likely than those preferring an Emirate to cite human rights (29.3% and 25.5% respectively), women’s rights (20.5% and 11.3% respectively), and freedom of speech and youth rights (10.8% and 5.8% respectively). On the other hand, respondents who prefer an Emirate were more likely than those who prefer a Republic to cite reconstruction/economic issues (26.4% and 20.9% respectively), education (11.3% and 7.5% respectively), and rule of law (10.4% and 6.5% respectively) (see Figure 5).




Figure 5: Respondents’ negotiation priorities according to government system preference

Multivariate analysis shows that male respondents were significantly more likely than female respondents to express preference for an “Islamic Emirate,” “mixture of the two,” or “no preference,” after controlling for their age, education, and income. Preference for an “Islamic Republic” was similar among male and female respondents. Higher income among respondents was associated with preference for a “mixture of the two” political systems, while inversely associated with “no preference” option. Furthermore, respondents with high school and university education were more likely than those without education to prefer an “Islamic Republic.”

### Constitutional Concerns

When asked whether the current constitution should continue to be used as the basis of legal structures and laws following the peace agreement, 31.7% of respondents said yes, 25.0% said no, and 31.7% said that it should be used, but needs to be changed or amended (see Figure 6); 10.2% said they don’t know. Men (32.4%) were slightly more likely than women (28.7%) to say yes, and women (13.7%) were more likely than men (9.3%) to say they don’t know, but men and women had relatively similar responses to “no” (25.5% and 23.1% respectively) and “yes, but needs changes” (31.3% and 33.3% respectively).




Figure 6: Preference for keeping the constitution with some amendments

For the most part, with increase in education, respondents were significantly less likely to say they don’t know if the constitution should remain in place (17.4% of those with no education, 13.6% with primary education, 7.1% with high school education, and only 5.7% with university education), and respondents with no education were the least likely to say that it should, but needs amendments (23.7% of those with no education and ranging from 31.3% to 36.1% for all other education levels). Respondents with religious education (44.4%) were much more likely than those with any other level of education (ranging from 26.1% to 32.9%) to say the constitution should remain in place, and much less likely to say it should not remain in place (11.1% of those with religious education compared to roughly one-quarter of all other respondents), but the sample size is too small to consider

this a significant finding without replicated responses. No distinct patterns emerge with income level of respondent, but 36.6% of respondents in the youngest age bracket (18 to 25 years old) said they think the constitution should remain the basis of law, but should be amended, as opposed to 26.1% of respondents over 45 years old. This youngest group of respondents (22.9%) was also less likely than all others (ranging from 24.3% to 27.7%) to say the constitution should not remain in place.

Respondents from the Central/Hazarajat (37.1%) and East (34.8%) regions were the most likely to say the current constitution should be kept, and those from the South West (27.1%) were the least likely. Respondents from the South West (32.4%) and the West (31.0%) were the most likely to say it should not be kept, while those from the East (20.9%) were the least likely. Respondents from the Central/Kabul (33.9%) and North West (33.6%) regions were most likely to say the current constitution should be kept but amended. There is some strong provincial variation, with respondents in Khost (44.7%), Bamyan (38.2%), Daikundi (36.3%) and Panjsher (36.1%) most likely to say the current constitution should be kept, and respondents in Ghor (17.6%) the least likely. Respondents in Baghlan (33.5%) and Kandahar (35.9%) were most likely to say it should not be kept, and respondents in Logar (13.4%), Khost (14.1%), and Panjsher (15.7%) were least likely to say it should not be kept.

Opinions on whether or not the constitution should remain in place do not clearly align with preferred system of government, and those who state a preference for an Emirate do not necessarily reject the current democratic constitution (see Figure 7).




Figure 7: Preference for constitutional acceptance, rejection, or change according to preferred system of government

Multivariate analysis shows that respondents with higher income were more likely to say the existing constitution should remain as the basis for all laws and legal structures after the peace agreement. Some level of formal education, primary to university level, compared to those without any education is associated with higher responses that the existing constitution needs amendment. Male respondents were more likely to think the constitution should not remain the basis of all laws and legal structures.

## Foreign Troop Presence

When asked if foreign troop presence is necessary to guarantee the implementation of a peace agreement, almost half of respondents (47.1%) said no, 36.6% said yes, 8.9% said it may be helpful, and 6.3% said they didn't know (see Figure 8). Women were more likely than men to say yes (41.0% and 35.4% respectively) and that it may be helpful (12.3% and 8.1% respectively), while men (49.2%) were more likely than women (38.3%) to say it is not necessary.




Figure 8: Respondents who say foreign troop presence is unnecessary

Education level of respondents does not closely correlate with responses, but those with high school (37.0%) or university education (40.2%) were slightly more likely than those with no education (34.7%) or primary education (28.3%) to say that foreign troop presence is necessary or might be helpful (for instance, 10.4% of those with university education compared to 6.4% of those with no education). As income levels rise, so does the likelihood of respondents saying that troop presence is necessary or may be helpful, with a corresponding drop in likelihood that they will say foreign troop presence is not necessary. Age is not a strong predictive factor.

Some regional differences are seen, with respondents in the South East (41.6% and Central/Kabul (38.8%) regions more likely than other respondents to say foreign troop presence may be necessary. Respondents in the East (51.1%), North West (51.5%), and West (51.1%) were the most likely to say it is not necessary, and respondents in the South West (12.2%) and South East (10.5%) were the most likely to say it may be helpful (see Figure 9).




Figure 9: Is foreign troop presence necessary, by region.

Multivariate analysis shows that older respondents were more likely to think presence of foreign troops is necessary to guarantee peace, while younger respondents think their presence is unnecessary. Female respondents, contrary to male respondents, were more likely to think presence of foreign troops may be helpful, while male respondents were more likely to report presence of foreign troops is not necessary. In terms of education, those with a university education (complete or incomplete) were more likely than those without any education to think that presence of foreign troops is necessary for peace, while those with primary education (complete or incomplete) think their presence is unnecessary. Additionally, higher income is associated with the perception that foreign troop presence is necessary as a guarantee for implementation of a peace agreement, while lower income is associated with the opposite view.

## Future of Taliban Fighters

Respondents were asked what they think should happen to Taliban fighters if there is a peace agreement with the Afghan Government. They were given the choices of being disarmed and returning to normal life, being integrated into the national security forces, remaining as they are, or to say they don't know. Overall, respondents were most likely to say that fighters should be integrated with the national security forces (45.3%) or that they should be disarmed (42.1%), with 6.8% saying they don't know and 4.7% saying they should stay as they are. Men were more likely than women to prefer integration of fighters (46.7% and 39.9% respectively), and women were more likely to say they should be disarmed (46.2% and 41.2% respectively).

Income and education level were not significant predictors of preference, although those in the lower income bracket and those with no education, as seen in other questions, were most likely to say they do not know. Those with university education were least likely to say that Taliban fighters should remain as they are (3.3%), compared to 5.0% to 8.3% of those with low or no education. Age is not a strong predictor, but respondents over 45 years old were more likely than those of any other age to say they don't know (10.1%). This could be due to the higher percentage of people in this age bracket that have little to no education, whereas the younger age brackets have typically had more access to education.

This is particularly true of older women, many of whom had no access to education, formal or otherwise.

Respondents in Bamyan (49.2%), Daikundi (49.6%), Panjsher (50.6%), and Takhar (48.2%) were most likely to say Taliban fighters should be disarmed, while those in Paktia (26.8%), Logar (34.9%), Laghman (35.6%), and Helmand (34.6%) were the least likely. Respondents in Kunduz (50.9%), Nangarhar (50.2%), and (Paktia 60.6%) were the most likely to say fighters should be integrated, and least likely were respondents in Samangan (34.5%), Khost (38.8%), and Bamyan (39.2%) (see Figure 10).




Figure 10: Respondents who say Taliban fighters should be integrated

Respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region (49.4%) were most likely to say that Taliban fighters should be disarmed. Respondents in the East region (36.5%) were least likely to say they should be disarmed and most likely to say they should be integrated into national security forces. Respondents in the West (48.5%) and North East (47.0%) were also more likely than others to say that fighters should be integrated. Respondents in the South West (6.8%) and West (5.3%) were more likely than respondents in other regions to say fighters should remain as they are (see Figure 11).




Figure 11: Preference for fate of Taliban fighters by region

Multivariate analysis shows that older respondents and women were more likely to say the Taliban fighters should stay as they are after a peace agreement, while men were more likely to say Taliban fighters be integrated into the national security forces compared to women. Respondents with higher income and respondents with some formal education, primary to university, were more likely than those without any education to suggest the Taliban fighters be disarmed and return to normal lives.

## Role of Women in Politics

When asked about their preference for women’s role in politics after a peace agreement, respondents were significantly more likely to say women should have a greater role (58.4%) than to say they should have the same role (18.8%) or a lesser role (14.2%) (see Figure 12).




Figure 12: Respondents who state women should have a greater role in politics after peace negotiations

Female respondents (78.2%) were more likely than male respondents (53.6%) to say that women should have a greater role, and men (16.2%) were more likely than women (6.1%) to say they should have a lesser role (see Figure 13).




Figure 13: Preferred role of women in politics after a peace settlement, by gender

As the age of respondents increases, preference for women having a greater role in politics decreases, with Afghans over 45 years old (54.3%) less likely than those 18 to 25 years old (62.1%) to say they prefer women have a greater role in politics. Likewise, as the education level of the respondent increases, there is an increase in preference for women having a greater role, with 54.0% of those with no education and 65.6% of respondents with university education saying they want a greater role for women in politics. A corresponding decrease in a preference for women having a lesser role is seen as education rises (18.3% of those with no education and 11.5% of those with university education).

Income level does not play a clear role in predicting a preference for women’s role in politics, with 58.1% of those in the 0-7,500 Afs income bracket, 54.0% in the middle income bracket, and 55.7% of those in the upper income bracket preferring a greater role for women, and only a 3 percentage point range difference in preference for a lesser role. Those in the upper income bracket (23.4%) were more likely to state a preference for the status quo than those in the middle (21.7%) and lower (17.9%) income brackets.

While countrywide there is much support for increasing women’s role in politics, there is significant variation in regional responses (see Figure 14). Respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region (72.3%) were significantly more likely than others to say that women should have a greater role in politics after peace negotiations. Respondents from the Central/Kabul (62.7%), South East (58.8%), North West (58.7%), and North East (55.9%) regions were more likely to favor a greater role than those from the West (51.1%), East (49.4%), and South West (39.3%) to favor a greater role. Respondents in the South West (26.0%) and West (23.0%) were more likely than respondents from other regions to prefer women’s role remains the same, and respondents from the East (20.9%), West (18.5%), and South West (18.3%) were more likely than other respondents to say that women’s role should decrease.




Figure 14: Preferred role of women in politics after peace negotiations, by region

Multivariate analysis shows that female respondents were more likely to support greater or the same role for women in the politics after a peace agreement, while younger male respondents were more likely to oppose a greater role for women in politics. Respondents with high school or university education were more likely than those without any education to think the role of women should stay the same, while those with university education were more likely to support a greater role for women in politics, after controlling for effect of age, gender, and income.

**Heart of Asia Society** (HAS), founded in 2019 in Kabul, is an independent Afghan think tank working to expand research and dialogue in Afghanistan and among countries of the Heart of Asia region. HAS prioritizes support to the ongoing peace process in Afghanistan, with a special focus on conducting research and facilitating dialogue aimed at garnering regional consensus and support for Afghan peace. Please read more on our work at: [www.heartofasiasociety.org](http://www.heartofasiasociety.org).

## APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Which political system do you prefer to come out of the peace negotiations?
  - A. Islamic Republic
  - B. Islamic Emirate
  - C. Mixture of the two
  - D. No preference
  
2. What should be the top three priorities in intra-Afghan negotiations between the Government and the Taliban when those negotiations start?
  - A.
  - B.
  - C.
  
3. Is foreign troop presence necessary as a guarantee for the implementation of a peace agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban?
  - A. Yes, it is necessary
  - B. No, it is not necessary
  - C. It may be helpful
  - D. I don't know
  
4. In case of a peace agreement between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, what should happen to the Taliban fighters?
  - A. They should be disarmed and return to normal lives
  - B. They should be integrated into national security forces
  - C. They should stay as they are
  - D. I don't know
  
5. Should the existing constitution remain the basis and source of all laws and legal structures even after the peace agreement?
  - E. Yes
  - F. No
  - G. Yes, but the constitution needs to be amended
  - H. I do not know
  
6. What do you think about the role of women in politics after a peace agreement is signed?
  - A. Women should have greater role
  - B. Women's role should be lesser
  - C. Women's role should stay the same
  - D. I don't know



## APPENDIX 2: REGRESSION TABLES

Q1. Political systems

	Islamic Republic	Islamic Emirate	Mixture of the two	No preference
(Intercept)	0.114 (0.614)	-1.765 (1.011)	-5.206 *** (1.125)	0.262 (0.849)
log(income)	0.081 (0.064)	-0.107 (0.103)	0.276 * (0.117)	-0.233 ** (0.087)
Education: Religious studies	-0.252 (0.557)	0.697 (0.779)	0.968 (0.790)	-0.868 (1.044)
Education: Primary school	-0.067 (0.199)	-0.007 (0.339)	0.182 (0.399)	0.053 (0.244)
Education: High school	0.415 ** (0.132)	-0.107 (0.214)	0.097 (0.265)	-0.684 *** (0.175)
Education: University	0.702 *** (0.135)	-0.346 (0.223)	-0.019 (0.262)	-1.070 *** (0.190)
Education: Not provided	-0.291 (0.214)	0.515 (0.318)	0.658 (0.388)	-0.160 (0.287)
Age	0.005 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.006)
Gender: Male	-0.177 (0.178)	0.698 * (0.354)	-0.639 * (0.252)	0.519 (0.300)
N	2567	2567	2567	2567
logLik	-1348.642	-647.882	-535.496	-811.798
AIC	2715.284	1313.764	1088.993	1641.595

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.

Q2. Top Priorities in Intra-Afghan Negotiations

	Peace	Education	Freedom of speech and youth rights
(Intercept)	1.002 (0.625)	-1.587 (0.905)	-5.782 *** (0.835)
log(income)	0.018 (0.066)	-0.028 (0.095)	0.326 *** (0.086)
Education: Religious studies	-0.609 (0.597)	0.354 (1.062)	-12.937 (373.221)
Education: Primary school	0.732 * (0.302)	-0.644 (0.546)	-0.158 (0.407)
Education: High school	-0.141 (0.148)	0.908 (0.236)	0.907 *** (0.215)
Education: University	-0.424 ** (0.143)	0.467 (0.244)	0.864 *** (0.213)
Education: Not provided	-0.021 (0.266)	1.625 (0.306)	0.180 (0.409)
Age	0.009 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)
Gender: Male	0.095 (0.160)	-0.986 (0.188)	-0.125 (0.200)
N	2578	2578	2578
logLik	-1288.085	736.469	-870.004
AIC	2594.170	1490.938	1758.008

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.

	Common good	Intra-Afghan negotiations	Territorial integrity and stability
(Intercept)	-0.687 (1.310)	-3.096 * (1.273)	-5.859 ** (1.781)
log(income)	-0.289 * (0.140)	-0.087 (0.133)	0.135 (0.182)
Education: Religious studies	-12.739 (615.947)	0.862 (1.067)	1.422 (1.095)
Education: Primary school	-0.216 (0.644)	0.441 (0.459)	-0.228 (0.788)
Education: High school	0.161 (0.355)	0.013 (0.335)	0.213 (0.434)



Education: University Education:	0.698 *	0.724 *	0.574
	(0.331)	(0.300)	(0.408)
Education: Not provided	0.030	-0.578	-14.442
	(0.646)	(0.755)	(597.442)
Age	-0.006	0.005	0.000
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Gender: Male	-0.173	0.219	0.497
	(0.328)	(0.347)	(0.532)
N	2578	2578	2578
logLik	-370.276	-423.009	-256.613
AIC	758.552	864.017	531.225

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.

	Women's rights	Reconstruction/economic development	Human rights
(Intercept)	-1.992 **	1.461 *	-2.997 ***
	(0.678)	(0.594)	(0.567)
log(income)	0.147 *	-0.248 ***	0.180 **
	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.059)
Education: Religious studies	1.798 **	0.207	-0.311
	(0.557)	(0.597)	(0.656)
Education: Primary school	0.171	0.390 *	-0.020
	(0.294)	(0.199)	(0.213)
Education: High school	0.681 ***	-0.038	0.400 **
	(0.178)	(0.133)	(0.129)
Education: University Education:	0.805 ***	-0.173	0.413 **
	(0.173)	(0.134)	(0.127)
Education: Not provided	0.441	-0.323	0.284
	(0.303)	(0.252)	(0.225)
Age	-0.007	-0.002	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gender: Male	-1.456 ***	-0.228	0.199
	(0.143)	(0.156)	(0.151)
N	2578	2578	2578
logLik	-1143.775	-1386.612	-1559.066
AIC	2305.550	2791.225	3136.132

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.

	Current state	ISIS	Rule of law	Sharia
(Intercept)	-7.270 ***	-8.049 ***	0.039	-4.214 *
	(1.182)	(2.392)	(0.929)	(1.695)
log(income)	0.247 *	0.303	-0.296 **	-0.089
	(0.118)	(0.240)	(0.098)	(0.149)
Education: Religious studies	-12.132	2.149 *	0.890	1.600 *
	(371.973)	(0.856)	(0.782)	(0.804)
Education: Primary school	-0.353	-0.843	0.753	-1.003
	(0.640)	(1.066)	(0.485)	(0.748)
Education: High school	0.574	-0.709	0.371	0.133
	(0.322)	(0.583)	(0.214)	(0.300)
Education: University Education:	1.306 ***	-0.139	-0.013	-0.197
	(0.297)	(0.490)	(0.227)	(0.320)
Education: Not provided	-0.442	0.205	1.147 ***	-0.359
	(0.760)	(0.798)	(0.290)	(0.629)
Age	0.013	0.017	-0.002	-0.013
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Gender: Male	0.907 *	0.365	0.102	2.222 *
	(0.375)	(0.750)	(0.271)	(1.012)
N	2578	2578	2578	2578



logLik	-507.236	-	-	-356.597
AIC	1032.472	157.116	677.394	731.195
		2	788	
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.				
	Aiding poor/injured	Securing achievements	Power sharing/unity	
(Intercept)	1.618 (1.777)	-7.111 *** (1.467)	-3.655 ** (1.130)	
log(income)	-0.567 ** (0.190)	0.239 (0.149)	0.004 (0.117)	
Education: Religious studies	1.700 (1.101)	-14.824 (1672.036)	-12.572 (375.117)	
Education: Primary school	-0.936 (1.055)	-1.153 (1.049)	-0.176 (0.463)	
Education: High school	-0.403 (0.478)	0.319 (0.390)	0.307 (0.260)	
Education: University Education:	-0.200 (0.463)	1.035 ** (0.353)	0.342 (0.257)	
Education: Not provided	0.718 (0.607)	-14.615 (595.594)	0.116 (0.465)	
Age	-0.013 (0.016)	0.015 (0.010)	0.010 (0.008)	
Gender: Male	-0.084 (0.556)	0.439 (0.408)	0.214 (0.316)	
N	2578	2578	2578	
logLik	-186.382	-342.449	-538.110	
AIC	390.765	702.898	1094.220	
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.				
	Foreign interference	Pro-Taliban priorities	Anti-Taliban priorities	Corruption
(Intercept)	-32.729 (2106.601)	-22.977 (1795.501)	-16.767 (1216.436)	1.173 (2.025)
log(income)	-0.773 ** (0.245)	0.231 (0.406)	-0.422 (0.428)	-0.599 ** (0.217)
Education: Religious studies	19.281 (1189.152)	-15.001 (7291.275)	0.061 (7460.334)	1.593 (1.102)
Education: Primary school	0.217 (2571.123)	1.297 (1.418)	16.541 (1216.430)	-0.894 (1.057)
Education: High school	16.319 (1189.152)	0.850 (1.133)	15.614 (1216.430)	-0.212 (0.485)
Education: University Education:	17.978 (1189.152)	0.916 (1.120)	16.187 (1216.430)	-1.191 (0.631)
Education: Not provided	16.981 (1189.152)	-15.291 (2611.193)	16.814 (1216.430)	0.502 (0.674)
Age	0.021 (0.018)	-0.055 (0.040)	0.006 (0.030)	0.016 (0.016)
Gender: Male	17.252 (1738.874)	16.433 (1795.497)	-1.287 (0.745)	-0.496 (0.643)
N	2578	2578	2578	2578
logLik	-94.569	-67.090	-55.153	-144.731
AIC	207.138	152.180	128.305	307.463

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.

Q3. Presence of foreign troops

	Yes, it is necessary	No it is not necessary	It may be helpful
(Intercept)	-2.014 *** (0.535)	0.777 (0.517)	-2.774 ** (0.895)
log(income)	0.125 * (0.056)	-0.099 (0.054)	0.132 (0.094)
Education: Religious studies	-0.445 (0.593)	-0.616 (0.556)	1.410 * (0.611)
Education: Primary school	-0.191 (0.198)	0.361 (0.186)	-0.203 (0.366)
Education: High school	0.107 (0.121)	0.011 (0.115)	0.155 (0.209)
Education: University Education:	0.440 *** (0.118)	-0.260 * (0.114)	0.011 (0.209)
Education: Not provided	-0.526 * (0.237)	0.383 (0.207)	0.104 (0.369)
Age	0.010 * (0.004)	-0.009 * (0.004)	-0.002 (0.007)
Gender: Male	-0.176 (0.138)	0.488 *** (0.141)	-0.895 *** (0.191)
N	2562	2562	2562
logLik	-1668.148	-1748.836	-754.913
AIC	3354.296	3515.672	1527.825

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.



Q4. Taliban fighters

	They should be disarmed and return to normal lives	They should be integrated into national security forces	They should stay as they are
(Intercept)	-1.277 * (0.516)	-0.035 (0.509)	-1.918 (1.196)
log(income)	0.090 (0.054)	-0.019 (0.053)	-0.086 (0.126)
Education: Religious studies	0.647 (0.526)	-0.880 (0.591)	0.740 (0.783)
Education: Primary school	0.309 (0.186)	-0.353 (0.187)	-0.114 (0.385)
Education: High school	0.223 (0.118)	0.074 (0.115)	-0.358 (0.255)
Education: University Education:	0.385 *** (0.116)	-0.053 (0.113)	-0.737 ** (0.270)
Education: Not provided	-0.022 (0.212)	0.209 (0.204)	-2.081 * (1.019)
Age	0.000 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.016 (0.008)
Gender: Male	-0.120 (0.136)	0.294 * (0.138)	-0.590 * (0.299)
N	2566	2566	2566
logLik	-1738.115	-1765.646	-451.247
AIC	3494.231	3549.292	920.494

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.

Q5. Constitution to remain the basis and source of all laws

	Yes	No	Yes, but the constitution needs to be amended
(Intercept)	-0.262 (0.534)	-2.089 *** (0.569)	-1.492 ** (0.565)
log(income)	-0.023 (0.056)	0.100 (0.059)	0.010 (0.059)
Education: Religious studies	0.812 (0.527)	-1.069 (0.767)	0.361 (0.594)
Education: Primary school	-0.452 * (0.210)	0.098 (0.197)	0.586 ** (0.205)
Education: High school	0.039 (0.121)	0.048 (0.124)	0.496 *** (0.136)
Education: University Education:	0.060 (0.119)	-0.170 (0.125)	0.671 *** (0.133)
Education: Not provided	-0.260 (0.224)	-0.234 (0.231)	0.490 * (0.230)
Age	0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Gender: Male	-0.223 (0.140)	0.440 ** (0.164)	-0.015 (0.147)
N	2557	2557	2557
logLik	-1632.238	-1532.884	-1517.498
AIC	3282.477	3083.768	3052.996

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.

Q6. Role of women in politics

	Women should have greater role	Women's role should be less	Women's role should stay the same
(Intercept)	-0.262 (0.534)	-2.089 *** (0.569)	-1.492 ** (0.565)
log(income)	-0.023 (0.056)	0.100 (0.059)	0.010 (0.059)
Education: Religious studies	0.812 (0.527)	-1.069 (0.767)	0.361 (0.594)
Education: Primary school	-0.452 * (0.210)	0.098 (0.197)	0.586 ** (0.205)
Education: High school	0.039 (0.121)	0.048 (0.124)	0.496 *** (0.136)
Education: University Education:	0.060 (0.119)	-0.170 (0.125)	0.671 *** (0.133)
Education: Not provided	-0.260 (0.224)	-0.234 (0.231)	0.490 * (0.230)
Age	0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Gender: Male	-0.223 (0.140)	0.440 ** (0.164)	-0.015 (0.147)
N	2557	2557	2557
logLik	-1632.238	-1532.884	-1517.498
AIC	3282.477	3083.768	3052.996

\*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.



